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Abstract: In the aftermath of the global financial crisis monetary policies in 
advanced economies caused a surge in cross-border lending to emerging 
market economies (EMEs). Policymakers of EMEs criticized those policies 
on the grounds that they pave the way for financial imbalances in EMEs and 
called for international policy coordination.  Up to mid-2018 leverage of 
banks and foreign currency exposure of nonfinancial corporates increased 
sharply in Turkey. Under these conditions, a shock that causes a stop in 
capital flows can trigger crisis in EMEs. The Turkish economy was hit by 
several external shocks and entered a recession in the third quarter of 2018. 
This study aims at analyzing the role of financial vulnerabilities and 
domestic policies in Turkey’s 2018-19 crisis and draw policy lessons. We 
argue that, notwithstanding complaints regarding lack of international policy 
coordination, domestic policy mistakes played an important role in paving 
the way for the crisis. 
JEL Classification: E32, E52, F34, F42, G01, G38 
Keywords: Crisis, cross-border lending, currency mismatches, leverage   
 
*





Since the global financial crisis, there has been a substantial increase in global 
liquidity stemming from monetary policies implemented in large advanced 
economies. Consequently, a surge in cross-border lending to emerging market 
economies (EMEs) and a rapid rise in leverages of their financial sectors has been 
observed. Figure 1 shows the cross-border claims of Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) reporting banks on banks of EMEs and Turkey from the first 
quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2019. Despite there are some temporary 
deviations from the main upward trend, the rise in cross-border lending to banks of 
EMEs is considerable. The trend is much steeper for Turkey: the cross-border 
lending to banks increased sharply till 2016 and remained at elevated levels up to 
mid-2018 and then started to decline. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks on banks of emerging market economies and 
Turkey: 2007Q1-2019Q4 (index, 2007Q1=100) 




Yet, this is only one side of the story. As emphasized by Avdjiev, Chui, and Shin 
(2014), nonfinancial corporates (NFCs) from EMEs have also tapped offshore debt 
securities markets to obtain external funding. Avdjiev, McGuire, and Peter (2020) 
document the sharp rise in external creditors’ claims on NFCs of EMEs since the 
global financial crisis. Similarly, McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2015) show the 
rapid rise in outstanding US dollar liabilities of nonfinancial borrowers of EMEs in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of 
externally financed debt of NFCs together with the evolution of cross-border claims 
of BIS reporting banks on all sectors. The externally financed debt of NFCs was 
sizable and followed a similar trend with claims on all sectors.1 
  
 
Figure 2. Cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks on all sectors of Turkey and externally 
financed debt of nonfinancial corporates of Turkey: 2013Q4-2019Q4 (% GDP) 
Source: BIS and Central Bank of Turkey 
 
1
 Externally funded debt is calculated as in Avdjiev, McGuire, and Peter (2020). It is the sum of the following three 
components: (i) international debt securities issued by resident NFCs; (ii) direct cross-border credit of BIS reporting banks 
to resident NFCs; (iii) Indirect cross-border lending of BIS reporting banks to resident NFCs (cross border claims of BIS 
reporting banks-cross-border liabilities of BIS reporting banks). BIS reports data on (ii) since 2013Q4.  
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Policymakers of EMEs criticized lack of international policy coordination.2 They 
argued that advanced economies should take negative spillovers to EMEs –
appreciation pressure on their currencies and buildup of financial imbalances- into 
account when adjusting their monetary policies.3 Indeed, Turkey witnessed a rather 
rapid domestic credit growth and a sharp rise in currency mismatches on balance 
sheets of NFCs (Figure 3). We measure the currency mismatch as the difference 
between the liabilities and assets of NFCs denominated in foreign currency and 
linked to foreign currency. It covers claims on and liabilities to both residents and 
non-residents. It is striking how real credit volume and currency mismatch moved 
in tandem. This observation is in line with the findings of Giovanni et al. (2018) 
who show that there is a direct link between global liquidity, capital flows, and 
domestic credit boom in Turkey. Similarly, Özatay (2016) presents the significant 
positive relation between capital flows and credit supply in Turkey. Chui, Kuruc, 
and Turner (2018) show that rise in corporate indebtedness and currency 
mismatches on balance sheets of NFCs are common to most of EMEs. Avdjiev, 
McGuire, and Peter (2020) document how foreign currency borrowing of NFCs 
from both domestic and foreign sources has risen in EMEs after the global financial 
crisis. 
As highlighted by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), rapid increase in leverage 
plays a significant role across all types of crisis. Schularick and Taylor (2012) 
similarly document the powerful predictive power of real credit growth for financial 
crises.4 Excessive foreign currency debt and currency mismatches are at the center 
stage of early financial crisis models presented in Aghion, Bachetta, and Banarjee 
 
2
 A well-known example is the criticisms of the governor of Reserve Bank of India (Rajan, 2013).  
3
 In the aftermath of the global financial crisis discussions on international policy coordination heightened. See, for 
example, the contributions in Bayoumi, Pickford, and Subachi (2015), Bordo, and Taylor (2017), Feenstra and Taylor (2013), 
and Fukuda and Shioji (2016).  
4
 Ganioglu (2016), using a sample of 24 advanced and 21 developing economies, shows that excessive credit growth is a 
leading indicator of banking crises.  
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(2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco 
(2004), Chang and Velasco (2001), and Krugman (1999) among others. 
 
 
Figure 3. Real domestic credit volume in Turkey (index, 2007Q1=100, left axis) and currency 
mismatches on balance sheets of nonfinancial corporates in Turkey (net foreign liabilities of 
nonfinancial corporates as % GDP, right axis): 2007Q1-2019Q4 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey and Turkey Data Monitor 
 
The Turkish economy was hit by a crisis in August 2018 and entered a recession 
in the third quarter of 2018. It took six quarters for GDP to exceed its pre-crisis 
peak level. During this period, a net capital outflow occurred which amounted to 
1.9% of GDP. Claims of BIS reporting banks on resident banks and foreign external 
debt of NFCs declined sharply (Figures 1 and 2) and the lira depreciated 
considerably. Both the duration and the magnitude of GDP contraction were lower 
than those observed during the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the decline in 
the employment rate was much higher during the 2018-19 episode. It is the 
objective of this study to analyze Turkey’s 2018-19 crisis, document the role of 
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financial fragilities and the lack of timely domestic policy response to correct 
financial imbalances in the crisis, and draw policy lessons.5 
There are two important features of the crisis. Notwithstanding the discussions 
on the lack of policy coordination among advanced economies and EMEs, the first 
feature of the crisis is the lack of domestic macroprudential financial policies to 
contain rise in leverage and currency mismatches. In fact, Turkey eased foreign 
currency borrowing regulations as a response to the global financial crisis. The 
decision was not revoked until January 2018. Apparently, this was an important 
policy mistake that led to an increase in currency mismatches.6 Moreover, elevated 
cross-border lending and the ensuing increase in credit supply led to a boom in 
construction activity in the expense of investments in tradable sectors. Again the 
policymakers did not take any measure to reduce the rate of growth of credit supply 
to the construction sector. By the sharp depreciation of currency in the third quarter 
of 2018, the real estate sector collapsed and non-performing loans elevated. This 
was one of the main factors behind the heavy loss in employment. 
Second, the Turkish case demonstrates how a financially fragile country is 
susceptible to various types of shocks –even to tweet posts. In the eve of the crisis, 
fiscal policy was sound and the banking sector was strong. Nevertheless, high 
foreign currency debt and currency mismatches on balance sheets of NFCs rendered 
them vulnerable to a sudden stop in cross-border lending. A sudden stop is an 
important threat for EMEs with currency mismatches (Calvo, 1998; Forbes and 
Warnock, 2012). Alfaro et al. (2017) show that currency depreciations magnify the 
impact of leverage on financial weakness for large firms during a crisis. 
Bruno and Shin (2015a) highlight the close relationship between banking sector 
capital flows and US monetary policy. The model that they develop indicates the 
 
5
 Previous crises in Turkey are analyzed in Akyürek (2006), Akyüz and Boratav (2003), Alper and Onis (2003), Özatay 
(2000), Özatay and Sak (2002), and Özkan (2005). 
6
 For a recent discussion on policy options, see Rey (2018).  
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role of the US dollar appreciation in the tightening of global financial conditions 
and association of financial crises with dollar shortages. Rey (2018), based on a 
VAR analysis, finds that monetary policy in the center country affects leverage of 
global banks and credit flows in the global financial system. Tightening of the US 
monetary policy leads to a decrease in cross-border flows (Bruno and Shin, 2015b). 
A policy rate hike cycle can have huge impact on EMEs through tighter supply of 
dollars, a rise in domestic currency borrowing rates, deterioration in balance sheets 
of sectors which have significant currency mismatches (Acharya et al., 2015).7 
Forbes and Warnock (2012) emphasize that increases in global risk predict sudden 
stops in capital flows. A widely used indicator of global risk is the VIX index -the 
implied volatility in S&P 500stock index option prices from Chicago Board 
Options Exchange. Bruno and Shin (2015a, 2015b) and Rey (2018) demonstrate 
the close link between global liquidity and VIX. 
We present that the main triggering factor was not a rise in global risk aversion. 
The global risk aversion measured by VIX was at historically low levels throughout 
2017 and close to these low levels in 2018 –especially from April 2018 to October 
2018. Yet, the main triggering factor was a series of rather negative messages from 
the president of the US in July and August 2018. This demonstrates that it is not 
only an economic factor such as the stance of the monetary policy of the US that 
affects the risk appetite and cross-border flows, factors related with foreign policy 
can also play a dominant role.  In the Turkish case, the threats of Donald Trump 
sharply increased risk perception for Turkey and led to a shortage of dollar supply. 
This indicates how risky carrying big currency mismatches on balance sheets is.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents the 
evolution of the exchange rate, interest rate, foreign currency reserves, and the 
 
7
 One strand of the literature discusses global “push factors” for capital flows. See, among others, Diaz-Alejandro (1983), 
Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996), Reinhart and Reinhart (2009). 
8 
 
market pressure during the crisis. Section III is on economic fundamentals of the 
pre-crisis period. We also compare these fundamentals with those of the pre-global 
crisis period. The triggering factors are discussed in Section IV. The impact of the 
crisis on output and employment are documented and contrasted with those of the 
global financial crisis episode in Section V. We discuss policy implications in 
Section VI. Section VII concludes.  
II. PRESSURE IN THE MARKETS 
Figure 4 presents the value of the lira against an equal weighted basket of the 
euro and the US dollar, and the evolution of the overnight money market rate from 
the first business day of 2017 to the last business day of February 2020. Figure 5 
shows the time path for the weekly official foreign exchange reserves in the same 
period. The exchange rate and money market rate exhibited an upward trend -a rise 
of the exchange rate shows depreciation whereas the reserves followed a downward 
trend starting from early 2018. The deterioration in each of the variables was rather 
sharp in the first half of August 2018.8 
To highlight the severity of the pressure in the markets and contrast it with what 
happened during the 2000-2001 and global crisis episodes, we form an exchange 
market pressure index along the lines of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) 
for the January 2000 - February 2020 period. It is an equal weighted average of the 
monthly percentage changes of basket exchange rate, money market rates, and (the 
negative of) official reserves. The monthly percentage change of each variable is 
weighted by the inverse of its variance. There are three instances at which the index 
exceeds its two standard deviations: the first one marks the end of the preannounced 
crawling peg exchange rate regime of the January 2000 - February 2001 period. 
 
8
 The first case of corona virus infected person was identified in early March 2020 and various social distancing measures 
were put in place in the second half of 2020. This is why we end the sample on the last business day of February 2020. 
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This regime was collapsed in February 2001 and Turkey faced a severe crisis. Since 
then Turkey has been implementing a floating exchange rate regime. The second 
instance is the October 2008 period and the third one is the August 2018 – 
September 2018 period (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 4. Overnight money market rate (%, left axis) and exchange rate (lira per equal weighted 
basket of US dollar and euro, right axis): January 2017-February 2020 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey and Turkey Data Monitor 
 
Two points should be emphasized. First, the market pressure in the first instance 
(February-April 2001) was higher than the last two cases. A number of researchers 
has analyzed this crisis and a further analyze is beyond the scope of this paper.9 
What is important from the perspective of the current study is that in the aftermath 
of the 2000-2001 crisis, Turkey implemented a stabilization and structural 
adjustment program up to 2007 and corrected a number of significant imbalances 
in its economy as discussed in the next section. Despite this fact, Turkey was deeply 
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affected from the global crisis -the second instance marked by the market pressure 
index- and faced another crisis in August 2018. Second, the pressure on the market 
was significantly higher in the last episode compared to the global crisis period. We 
discuss the underlying reasons in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 5. Foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of Turkey (billions of US dollars): 
January 2017-February 2020 





Figure 6. Exchange market pressure index: January 2000-February 2020 
Notes: The horizontal dashed line indicates two-standard deviation. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Turkey Data Monitor 
 
III. ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS 
A From the 2000-2001 Crisis to the Global Crisis 
In April 2001, almost two months after the collapse of the lira, Turkey announced 
a new IMF supported economic program. Establishing fiscal discipline, 
strengthening the financial sector, and changing the institutional structure that 
paved the way to the 2001 crisis were the main elements of the program. It was 
implemented up to the onset of the global financial crisis. The program was 
successful in decreasing inflation and increasing per-capita GDP growth. Consumer 
inflation declined to 8.5% at the end of 2007 from a level of 68.5% at the end of 
2001. The average per-capita growth rate of 2002-2007 was 5.5% -more than two 






Indicators of Economic Fundamentals 
 2000a 2007 
 
2010 2011-14b 2015 2016 2017 
Current account balance (% GDP) -3.6 -5.4 -5.7 -6.1 -3.2 -3.1 -4.7 
Net capital inflow (% GDP) 4.7 6.6 7.5 7 1.1 2.6 4.5 
Net international investment position (% 
GDP) 
-36 -45.9 -46.7 -44.1 -44.2 -42.3 -53.8 
Foreign exchange exposure of the 
nonfinancial corporate sector (% GDP)d 
n.a.c 7 11.6 17.9 23.5 27.3 25.5 
Reserves of the central bank/M2 (year 
average) 
0.27 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.26 
Reserves of the central bank (% GDP) 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.8 6.3 5.6 
Public debt (% GDP) 37.1 37.6 40.6 33.2 28.9 28.9 28 
Foreign currency denominated and 
indexed public debt e (% of total debt) 
45.7 31.4 26.7 30.2 35.1 38.3 38.9 
Budget balance (% GDP) -7.6 -1.5 -3.4 -1.3 -1 -1.1 -1.5 
Primary budget balance (% GDP) 4.3 3.9 0.7 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.3 
Total credit volume (% GDP)  18.6 32.2 45 54.2 63.2 66 67 
Real credit growth (%, year average) 5.6 18.4 20.5 20.1 18.3 4.7 9.6 
Non-performing credit ratio (%) 12.4 3.5 3.8 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.1 
Return to capital (%) -38 20 16.4 12.5 9.9 12.5 13.6 
Credit-to-deposit ratio   0.54 0.8 0.85 1.07 1.19 1.19 1.23 
Consumer inflation f (%) 39 8.4 6.4 8.1 8.8 8.5 11.9 
Expected consumer inflation f (one-year 
ahead, %) 
n.a. 6.1 7 6.9 7.6 8 9.3 
Money market rate g (nominal, %) 234.5 16.2 6.1 9.2 10.8 8.5 12.5 
Currency default swaps g (basis points) n.a. 172 144 201 272 283 177 
Real exchange rate h 115.6 127.8 120.2 105.3 99.1 93.6 86.4 
GDP growth rate (%) 5.9 5.9 8.4 7.4 6.1 3.2 7.5 
Employment rate i (%) n.a. 40 42.4 44.3 46.4 46.1 47.8 
Notes: a There were two GDP revisions after 2000. % GDP values are calculated using the latest GDP figures. The 
latest GDP figure for 2000 is 1.43 times higher of the GDP figure for 2000 before the revisions. That is, in the 
information set of economic agents of the time, these ratios were higher by 1.43 times. b Period averages. c ‘n.a.’ 
stands for not available. d Foreign currency exposure of the nonfinancial corporate sector denotes the gap between 
the foreign exchange denominated and linked liabilities and assets of the nonfinancial corporate sector. e Only 
foreign currency denominated debt for 2000. f End of the year values. g Averages of daily data for December. h An 
increase denotes real appreciation. i Labor statistics before 2005 are not comparable. 
Source: Turkish Data Monitor. 
 
Several factors contributed to this achievement. The first one was the radical 
correction of a number of economic imbalances of the pre-2001 crisis period. On 
the structural side; the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) gained its independence, an 
autonomous banking sector supervisory and regulatory agency (BRSA) was 
formed, the banking sector was recapitalized, agricultural support system was 
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redesigned, and the tender law was changed to reduce corruption. On the 
stabilization side; fiscal policy and financial sector indicators improved drastically. 
Table 1 compares the 2000 and 2007 –pre-crisis- values of a set of key 
macroeconomic variables. It should be emphasized that the collapse of the lira in 
February 2001 and the subsequent policy reaction deteriorated considerably several 
variables with respect to 2000. So, the positive performance becomes more striking 
when one focuses on the changes between 2001 and 2007 for a number of variables. 
For example, public debt jumped to 72.5% of GDP (it was known as almost 100% 
of GDP at the time –see the notes for Table 1), non-performing loan ratio elevated 
to 41.4%, and the inflation rate increased to 68% at the end of 2001. Second, 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union significantly improved and 
consequently, the European Council took the decision to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. Third, there was ample global liquidity 
in most of the period. However, absent the first factor, the positive effect of the 
second factor would have been rather minimal and the third factor could have 
amplified the imbalances. 
B The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Macroeconomic Indicators 
The strong fiscal stance created a sizable fiscal space for Turkey. This allowed 
Turkey to implement countercyclical fiscal policy in the 2009-2010 period as a 
response to its contracting economy, without increasing the risk perception.10 Five-
year credit default swap (CDS) was jumped to 830 basis points on the 23rd of 
October 2008. Nonetheless, during the period of fiscal stimulus, CDS was at low 
levels: it was hovering around 180 basis points in December 2009, and furthermore 
the December 2010 reading was even lower: 144 basis points. 
 
10
 Horton, Kumar, and Mauro (2009) appraise policy response of G20 countries.  
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The countercyclical fiscal policy without increasing sovereign risk was a 
manifestation of the graduation of Turkey from the procyclical fiscal policy camp.11 
Naturally, this policy raised public debt-to-GDP ratio, albeit the increase was 
limited and temporary. Consequently, public debt ratio followed a downward trend 
and reached a rather low level at the end of 2017 -thanks to low budget deficits and 
primary surpluses of the whole period of 2010-2017. 
Compared to the end of 2007, the ratios of foreign exchange reserves of the CBT 
to broad money (M2) and output stayed intact.12 Inflation was high relative to its 
peers however fluctuated around a mean of 8% in the period of 2008-2016 within 
a relatively low band. Furthermore, there was no deterioration in inflation 
expectations (Table 1). 
 
 
Figure 7. Five-year sovereign credit default swaps (CDS, basis points, left axis) and VIX (index, 
right axis): January 2017-February 2020 
Source: Turkish Data Monitor 
 
11
 For fiscal space, see for example, Gosh et al. (2013). The “graduation from the procyclical fiscal policy camp” term 
was coined by Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013). 
12
 Reserves-to-broad money ratio is an important vulnerability indicator (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1996). Gourinchas 





There were some negative signs as well. The foreign currency denominated or 
indexed share of public debt had started to increase since the last months of 2010 
and reached 39% at the end of 2017. Another concern was the borrowing and 
income guarantees given for the investment and operation of mega-projects.13 
However, the low debt ratio was limiting their importance (Table 1). 
The upshot is that most of the macroeconomic indicators were demonstrating a 
positive performance as of the end of 2017, and there was no deterioration relative 
to the end of 2007. The sovereign risk of Turkey supports this view: CDS was at 
low levels at the end of 2017 as at the end of 2007 (Figure 7, Table 1). 
C The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Global Liquidity, Leverage, Foreign Currency 
Mismatches, and Risks 
The discussion so far demonstrates that the main problems were the high leverage 
of the banking sector and the currency mismatches on the balance sheets of the 
NFCs on the eve of the crisis. In the introduction section, we document the rapid 
domestic credit increase (Figure 3), which is an important predictor of financial 
crises as emphasized by Schularick and Taylor (2012). Table 1 provides further 
information regarding the leverage of the banking sector. Domestic credit-to-output 
ratio –one of the three variables indicated by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) as 
playing a significant role across all types of crisis- increased more than two-folds 
from end-2007 to end-2017. Rey (2018) measures the leverage of the banking 
sector as the credit-to-deposit ratio. Table 1 documents the sharp rise in this ratio 
over the 2007–2017 period. Alfaro et al. (2017) compute Altman’s Z-scores for 
 
13
 Cufadar and Özatay (2017) assess the impact of foreign currency denominated debt on the implementation of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy for emerging market economies. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) argue that a principal cause 
of the 1997 Asian crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. 
16 
 
NFCs of 26 EMEs and classify countries’ corporate sectors into three: those in the 
safe zone, in the vulnerable zone, and in the distress zone. While the NFC sector of 
Turkey was in the safe zone from 2003-2007, it was in the vulnerable zone during 
the 2008-2014 period.  
Figure 3 presents the dramatic rise in currency mismatch on balance sheets of 
NFCs from the first quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2019. Table 1 also sheds 
light on this problem by comparing annual values: the gap between the foreign 
currency and foreign-currency-linked liabilities and assets of nonfinancial 
corporates was 7% of GDP at the end of 2007 and increased to 25.5% of GDP at 
the end of 2017. The gap widened further and reached 29% in the second quarter 
of 2018 -just before the burst of the crisis. Avdjiev, McGuire, and Peter (2020) 
estimate the externally funded debt and total foreign currency debt of NFCs for 16 
large EMEs. They demonstrate that both of the indicators (in percent of GDP) have 
risen sharply in the aftermath of the global currency crisis. Turkey is in the top five 
list (see Figure 2 for Turkey). Another mismatch indicator is the net international 
investment position.  It was -53.8% of GDP as of the end of 2017. This was the 
lowest reading among the emerging market economies in G20 and indicating eight 
percentage points deterioration relative to 2007.14 These developments have 
rendered Turkey vulnerable to a stop in cross-border lending and sharp 
depreciation. 
What are the determinants of cross-border lending? Bruno and Shin (2015a) 
estimate various panel regressions for a sample of 46 countries over the 1996Q1-
2011Q4 period taking cross-border loans of BIS-reporting banks on banking sector 
counterparties as the dependent variable. They show that a rise in global leverage 
 
14
 The net international investment position is the difference between the assets and liabilities of the residents with respect 
to non-residents, whereas the gap between the foreign exchange denominated and indexed liabilities and assets does not take 
into consideration the residency of the borrowers and creditors.  For the surge in foreign currency debt in Turkey, see also 
Acharya et al. (2015). 
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as proxied by the US brokers and dealers leverage (alternatively VIX) and real 
appreciation of local currency are associated with an increase in cross-border 
lending. Expansion of domestic money stock (M2) is another significant 
determinant of capital flows. They also report that higher GDP growth is positively 
associated with banking flows, whereas a rise in public debt-to-GDP ratio affect 
cross-border lending negatively, though they are not significant in all of the 
regressions. 
We estimate the same equation for Turkey for a sample period that spans from 
the first quarter of 2000 to the last quarter of 2019. Two alternative dependent 
variables are used: log first differences of cross-border loans of BIS-reporting banks 
to (i) banking sector counterparties, (ii) all sectors. The results are given in Table 2 
(columns B1, B2, T1, and T2). In all of the alternative specifications the change in 
public debt as a ratio to GDP (ΔB/Y) is significant and correctly signed: the higher 
the change in the debt ratio, the lower the change in cross-border lending to Turkey 
is. The global leverage (GL) is always correctly signed. It is significant for the 
regressions whose dependent variables are the log first difference of total cross-
border lending to Turkey (columns T1 and T2). The global leverage increases, so 
does the total cross-border lending to Turkey.  
The interest rate differential between Turkey and the US (i-E-i*) is not significant 
in B2 and T2, and moreover incorrectly signed in T2. This may arise due to not 
accounting for the risk premium for Turkey. We deduct the risk premium for 
Turkey (E) from the domestic money market rate (i) and then calculate the risk-free 
interest rate differential (i-E-i*). It is correctly signed (columns B3 and T3) and 
highly significant (T3). Finally we report a simplified version of the regressions in 
18 
 
columns B4 and T4. The risk-free interest rate differential is correctly signed and 
significant. Cross border-lending decreases with a rise in the risk-premium.15  
 
TABLE 2 
Determinants of Cross-border Lending 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 T1 T2 T3 T4 



















































































































Δ(i - i*)  0.0001 
(0.1) 
   -0.0001 
(1.2) 
  








R2 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.31 
DW 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log first difference of the cross-border claims on banks for the columns B1 to B4 and 
the log first difference of the total cross-border claims on Turkey for the columns T1 to T4. The sample period, when the 
lags of explanatory variables are taken into consideration, is 2000Q3–2019Q4. The regressions include a constant term as 
well. GL: Global leverage (the total liabilities and equity of US brokers and dealers as a ratio to their total assets). LL: Local 
leverage as measured by the liabilities-to-net worth ratio of local banking sector. Q: Real exchange rate. M2: Broad money. 
Y: GDP. B: Public debt stock. P: Consumer price index. i: Money market rate. i*: Federal funds rate. E: JP Morgan’s 
emerging market bond index for Turkey (EMBI). Δ is the first difference operator. Ln(.) denotes the logarithm of (.). All 
independent variables enter with one lag. Values reported in parentheses are absolute t-values. ***, **, * denote significance  
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The external claims on the banking sector, on all of the sectors, and on NFCs 
followed a downward trend since the second quarter of 2018 (Figures 1 and 2). As 
the discussion in the preceding subsection reveals, as of end 2017 there was not a 
noteworthy deterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals. The regression results 
documented in Table 2 imply that, in the absence of a weakening in macroeconomic 
 
15
 We use EMBI instead of CDS, since EMBI data allows more observations. Alternatively, we include the change in 
EMBI (with one lag) in B2 and T2. It is significant and correctly signed. To save space we do not report these results. 
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fundamentals (as proxied in the regressions by the public debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
risk premium), the main potential culprit for this reversal of capital flows to Turkey 
should be related with factors that caused a decrease in risk appetite for the Turkish 
financial domestic assets. We turn to this issue in the following section.  
IV. WHAT TRIGGERED THE CRISIS? 
As shown in section II, the spike in the market pressure index was in August 
2018. Figures 4-6 indicate that pressure in the market and risk perception for 
Turkey started to rise as of the early days of 2018. Consequently, there are two 
phases of the January-August 2018 period. The first one is from the beginning of 
the year roughly to July. The second is from July to mid of August. Several factors 
played an important role in these developments. 
  
A Monetary Policy in the US and Turkey 
The first warning signal regarding the vulnerability of EMEs to a tightening of 
dollar funding was the taper tantrum. In May 2013, the chair of the Fed Board 
announced that they were planning to gradually withdraw quantitative easing in 
future, which caused a rise in US Treasury yields. This led to an increase in 
financial stress in several EMEs. Turkey was one of them. The exchange rate rose 
by 8% and a 125 basis points increase in the sovereign risk premium (CDS) was 
recorded in one month. The CBT did not give any response. Despite this, the 
markets eventually calmed down. In mid-August, a research analyst coined the term 
“fragile five” for Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey –the countries 
expected to be mostly affected (negatively) from a monetary tightening in the US 
On December 17 and December 25, 2013, the police force started an operation 
against several ministers –including the minister of interior. The alleged accusation 
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was bribery, which increased the tension in the financial markets.16 One dollar was 
2.04 lira on the 16th of December, it then jumped to 2.1 lira on the 9th of January 
2014 and 2.35 lira on the 27th of January. An important point to note for the ensuing 
discussion is that the CBT kept its policy rate at 4.5% despite a surge in the 
exchange rate and its possible inflationary effects when the markets were jittery for 
a country which was among the fragile five group. 
On the 21st of January 2014, there was the regular meeting of the Monetary Policy 
Committee. Still, there was no response. The Prime-minister Erdogan applauded 
this policy in a press meeting in Brussels. Only after the sharp depreciation towards 
the end of January, in an extraordinary meeting, the CBT raised its policy rate to 
10%. This was a significant negative signal regarding the independence of the CBT 
and its commitment to the inflation target.17 On February 11, 2014, a Fed report to 
the Congress became public. One section of the report was on the impact of the 
possible monetary tightening in the US on EMEs. Turkey was identified as the 
number one country, which was going to be negatively affected.18 
From December 2015 to June 2018, the federal funds target rate (upper limit of 
the target range) increased by 1.75 percentage points. The Fed increased the federal 
funds target rate to 0.5% at the end of 2015 and to 0.75% at the end of 2016. These 
followed by three increases in 2017 and the target rate reached 1.5%. There were 
two increases in the first half of 2018: on the 22nd of March and on the 14th of June. 
The final reading of this period was 2%. 
From August 2005 to February 2018, there was not any prominent increase in the 
VIX index. On the 5th of February, it increased to 37.3, and then declined to rather 
 
16
 Later understood that this operation was targeting prime-minister Erdogan. In fact the group, one branch of which 
conducted this operation, attempted to a coup-d’etat on the 15th of July 2015.     
17
 See, for example, the commentary in Reuters on the 21st of January 2014: “The Turkish Central Bank shies away from 
rate hike, credibility questioned”:  https://news.trust.org/item/20140121141048-sbcp1 
18
 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20140211_mprfullreport.pdf  
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low levels, staying there almost up to the mid of December (Figure 7). The Fed 
heightened the federal funds target rate to 2.25% at the end of September and to 
2.5% on the 20th of December. In October 2017, the Fed initiated the process of 
balance sheet normalization. This process continued until August 2019. Total assets 
declined to under 3.8 trillion dollars from 4.5 trillion dollars in early 2015.  
Starting from 2017, Turkey witnessed two digit inflation levels. At the end of 
2017 the inflation rate was 11.9%, elevated to 15.4% in June 2018, and then to 
17.9% in August 2018. The inflation target was still 5%. Nevertheless, the CBT 
kept its average funding rate almost constant at 12% from April 2017 to mid-
November 2017, increased it to 12.75% in mid-December and preserved it at that 
level until the end of April 2018, despite the inflationary impact of the depreciation 
in the lira that started at the beginning of 2018. There were a number of measured 
increases up to mid of May. Then it raised its average funding rate by 3 percentage 
points, followed by a 1.25 percentage point increase in mid of June, and a 1.5 
percentage point increase one week later. The final response came in the mid of 
September by a 4.75 percentage point increase. Moreover, from the end of 
November 2016 up to the beginning of June 2018, the policy rate was kept constant 
at 8%. In this period, the tightening was realized by mainly funding through the late 
funding window, which normally central banks do not use. This is why the average 
funding rate was above the policy rate almost throughout this period. There are two 
points to be emphasized. First, the usage of various funding mechanisms to raise 
the average funding rate most of the time interpreted as the reluctance of the 
monetary authority to increase its policy rate and sooner or later would turn to a 
loose monetary policy. Second, this practice broadened concerns on whether the 
CBT was independent.19 
 
19
 On the 14th of May 2018, there was an interview with president Erdogan at Bloomberg TV in London. This reinforced 
concerns about proper conduct of monetary policy and the independence of the Central Bank. For example, in the May 25, 
2018 issue of Foreign Policy, an article appeared with the title: “Erdogan is Failing Economics 101” written by B. Daragahi. 
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The rate hikes in 2017 and the first half of 2018, the reduction in the balance 
sheet of the Fed, rising doubts about the independence of the CBT, and the decline 
of risk appetite in February 2018 contributed to the significant depreciation of the 
lira, rise in the money market rate, and the market pressure in the first half of 2018 
(see Figures 4-6). For example, from the end of 2017 to the last business day of 
June 2018, the dollar appreciated by 19% against the lira. However, from the end 
of June to the 13th of August 2018, the increase in the exchange rate was much 
sharper: 49%. That is, the culprit of the burst of the crisis in August 2018 was 
something else. Clearly, as reflected by rather low levels of the VIX index during 
this period, the culprit was not a decline in global risk appetite.  
B Tweets from Donald Trump 
On May 16, 2017 and November 24, 2017, Donald Trump the president of the 
US sent friendly messages to Turkey and its president Erdogan by tweets. This 
mood suddenly changed towards the spring of 2018. The first negative tweet was 
posted on the 17th of April 2018: “Pastor Andrew Brunson … is on trial and being 
persecuted in Turkey for no reason. They call him a Spy, but I am more a Spy than 
he is. Hopefully he will be allowed to come home to his beautiful family where he 
belongs!” The second tweet –on the 19th of July was harsher. The third one on the 
26th of July was explicitly threatening Turkey: “The United States will impose large 
sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson … 
This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!”  On the 1st of August, 
the US administration imposed sanctions against two top Turkish government 
officials.  
The fourth tweet of Mr. Trump posted on the 10th of August: “I have just 
authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey as 
their currency, the lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar … 
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Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!” The final shock tweet was 
posted on the 16th of August: “Turkey has taken advantage of the United States for 
many years. They are now holding our wonderful Christian Pastor … We will pay 
nothing for the release of an innocent man, but we are cutting back on Turkey!” On 
October 12, 2018, Mr. Brunson was released from Turkish custody and 
immediately returned to the United States. The next day Mr. Trump thanked Mr. 
Erdogan. 
Clearly, the sharp rise in tensions between Turkey and the US and the significant 
rise in market pressure and depreciation of the lira overlap: between early July and 
mid-August. Hence, the main triggering factor was a number of tweet messages of 
the president of US.20 
V. IMPACT ON OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT 
Economic contraction began in the third quarter of 2018. The contraction was 
milder than the contraction during the global financial crisis. GDP exceeded its pre-
crisis level in the third quarter of 2019 –six quarters after the pre-crisis peak GDP 
of 2018Q2. This duration covered 10 quarters in the global financial crisis episode 
(Figure 8). Strikingly, the decline in the employment rate was much higher during 
the 2018-19 episode (Figure 9). Yet, what were the underlying reasons? 
During the global crisis exports of goods and services declined due to a fall in 
foreign demand. However, in the final crisis episode the growth rate of exports was 
 
20 The 2016-19 period witnessed an escalation of Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. This fact raises the 
possibility that the military operations and the differences over Syria policy among Turkey, the US, and other members of 
NATO might have played an important role in creating the market pressure. On August 24, 2016, Turkey began a direct 
military intervention into Syria which targeted the Islamic State of Iraq. It ended on March 27, 2017. The second operation 
started on January 20, 2018. This operation increased tensions between the US and Turkey since it was aiming at cleaning 
the Afrin region from People’s Protection Units (YPG) which was an ally of the US. This timeline demonstrates that the 
second operation might have contributed to the rise in the market pressure observed in the first phase. However, the operation 
ended in late March 2018, from when to the end of December 2018 no publicly open negative message was heard from the 
sides of the conflict. On the contrary, Donald Trump tweeted several times in December 2018 emphasizing good relations 
and cooperation with Turkey on Syria. 
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always positive and its average was 10.2%. Consequently, the contribution of 
exports to the GDP growth was considerable.  Along with this fact, the average 
growth rate of government consumption was higher than that realized during the 
global crisis episode (Table 3). In the absence of the significant positive 
contribution of exports of goods and services and relatively higher contribution of 
government consumption, the order of magnitude of GDP contraction would have 
been close to that observed during the global crisis. 
 
 
Figure 8. The evolution of GDP during the global financial crisis and 2018-19 crisis (Index, global 
crisis: GDP=100 for 2008Q1; 2018-19 crisis: GDP=100 for 2018Q2) 
Source: Turkish Data Monitor 
 
The heavy loss in employment during the 2018-19 crisis is directly linked to the 
bust of the construction sector after its boom in the decade preceding it. 
Construction permits (square meters per capita), the share of construction 
investment in total investment, and the share of value added in construction sector 
in GDP demonstrate the extent of the boom. The boom in this labor-intensive 
industry elevated its share in total employment (Table 4). Note also that this period 
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coincides with the high credit growth and high foreign currency exposure period 
documented in Table 1. Table 5 compares the growth in loans allocated to the 
construction sector with the growth of loans allocated to the rest of the economy 
and documents how nonperforming construction loans disproportionately increased 
with the collapse of the construction sector. Consequently, a rather high job loss 
occurred in the sector and in the economy. 
 
Figure 9. The change in the employment rate during the global financial crisis and 2018-19 crisis 
(changes are with respect to t=0, percentage points) 
Source: Turkish Data Monitor 
TABLE 3 
GDP, Exports, Government Consumption Expenditures, and Value Added in Construction during 
Two Crises (Averages of Annualized Quarterly Growth Rates) 
 2008Q2 – 2010Q2 2018Q3 – 2019Q3 
 GDP -0.8 -0.3 
Exports of goods and services  -3.7 10.2 
Government consumption 2.2 3 
Value added in construction -3.6 -9.5 
Δ Total employment (thousand person) 1412 -677 
Δ Employment in construction (thousand person) 166 -539 
Notes: For the global crisis episode: The pre-crisis peak level of GDP is observed in 2008Q1 (t=0 in Figure 8) 
and the first quarter in which the GDP exceeded its pre-crisis level is 2010Q3 (t= 10 in Figure 8). For the 2018-
19 crisis episode: The pre-crisis peak level of GDP is observed in 2018Q2 (t=0 in Figure 8) and the first quarter 
in which the GDP exceeded its pre-crisis level is 2019Q4 (t= 6 in Figure 8). Δ is the first difference operator. 




Boom and Bust in Construction Activity 
 2007–2017 2010-2017 
 
2018-2019 
Construction permits (m2) per capita (% change)  109.7 86.8 -77 
Construction investment/total investment (change, pp) 15.3 8 -5.3 
Employment in construction/total employment (change, pp) 2 2.7 -3.6 
Value added in construction/GDP (change, pp) 1.3 0.9 -1.9 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Turkish Data Monitor. 
 
TABLE 5 
Credit Boom, Credit Crunch, and Non-performing Loans 
 2007M12 2010M12 2017M12 2018Q2 2019M12 
Share of construction credits (%) 7.5 7.9 10.5 10.5 10.6 
Nonperforming construction loans 
ratio (%) 
2.8 4.1 3.5 4.1 9.8 
Share of nonperforming 
construction loans in total 
nonperforming loans (%) 
6.2 9.1 12.2 14.1 19.3 
Nonperforming non-construction 
loans ratio (%) 
3.4 3.5 2.9 2.9 4.8 
Real credit (construction) 
(2007M12=100) 
100 148 409 440 397 
Real credit (non-construction) 
(2017M12=100) 
100 140 284 304 273 
Notes: End of period values. ‘M12’ denotes December. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We first discuss domestic policy implications. One of the salient features of the 
Turkish economy is the low savings rate and the associated high liability 
dollarization. The average savings-to-GDP ratio was 23.6% of GDP in the period 
of 2010-2017, well below the average of emerging and developing economies 
which was 32.8%. Moreover, savings-to-GDP ratio falls short of the investment-
to-GDP ratio of 29.1% which was again below the 32.3% average investment-to-
GDP ratio of emerging and developing economies.21 Low savings rate and the large 
 
21
 Data are from the World Economic Outlook Database of the IMF. 
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gap between investment and savings render the Turkish economy vulnerable to a 
shift in risk appetite of foreign financial investors. During periods of surge in capital 
flows, if policymakers do not take preventive macro and micro-prudential 
measures, foreign currency debt build-up and a boom in loan supply occurs. This 
causes tremendous problems when capital inflows stop and more importantly 
during sharp reversals for economic agents with foreign currency mismatch in their 
balance sheets. Note also that financial market depth has connection with domestic 
savings rate. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) present a model in which 
financial underdevelopment is associated with large foreign currency debt in 
balance sheets of NFCs. The first policy question that arises is how to increase the 
domestic savings rate. As documented elsewhere this is not an easy task (see, for 
example, World Bank, 2011). 
This brings us to the second policy issue. Unconventional monetary policies of 
the central banks of large advanced economies, on the one hand, created significant 
policy problems -rapid credit growth and pressure for exchange rate appreciation-, 
it was an opportunity for governments to increase economic activity on the other 
hand. Turkish authorities allowed the growth rate to surpass the potential growth 
rate by not taking sufficient prudential measures to curb rapid credit expansion, 
with the exception of a short-lived attempts of the CBT and the BRSA.22 
Conversely, Turkey eased foreign currency borrowing regulations. On July 11, 
2009, residents were allowed to borrow in foreign currency indexed debt and sign 
other contracts in foreign currency, and a restriction on the maturity of pre-
 
22
 See Table 1. Alper et al. (2018), Kara (2012), and Özatay (2011, 2012) discuss the repercussions of high credit growth 
on the conduct of monetary policy in the aftermath of the global crisis. 
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financing loans is loosened. The revisions stayed intact until January 25, 2018.23 
This was a significant policy mistake which paved the way for the 2018-19 crisis.24 
The third policy subject is related with how surges in foreign borrowing and 
domestic credit are utilized. In the Turkish case, as documented above, activity in 
a non-tradable sector –construction- had experienced a boom in the eve of the crisis 
and then a bust occurred in 2018 leading to a rather sharp loss of jobs. McCauley, 
McGuire, and Sushko (2015) draw attention to financial stability concerns that can 
arise from channeling external credit flows to leveraged real estate. Boom in real 
estate sector has also close connection with building bylaws and development plan 
laws. To the extent that they incentivize rent-seeking behavior a resource 
misallocation problem can arise. Consequently, there is an institutional dimension 
of the problem. A natural question that arises is how to lessen such misallocations 
by financial prudential policies and institutional reforms. 
The fourth policy topic is the conduct of monetary policy. The impressions on 
the reluctance of the CBT to tighten the monetary policy and ensuing concerns 
about its independence together with the developments discussed in the preceding 
sections raised demand for foreign currency assets of the residents. The share of 
foreign currency deposits in M2 –an indicator of dollarization- increased to the 
record high level of 60% in October 2001. Since then it almost continuously 
declined, and reached 26.3% at the end of 2010. This was a significant positive 
achievement. However, it is short lived: it raised to 39% at the end of 2017 and to 
46.8% in August 2018. It can be assessed that this fact and its underlying reasons 
increased vulnerabilities of the Turkish economy in the eve of the crisis as well.  
A final policy subject is international policy coordination which is much-debated 
more often than it is seen. For example in his survey of international coordination, 
 
23
 See Official Gazette numbers 26801 and 30312 for the relevant decrees. 
24
 Ganioğlu, Aytül (2016), for a sample of 24 advanced and 21 developing economies, shows that regulation and 
supervision weakness in the financial system plays a role in banking crises. 
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Eichengreen states that “the question is whether those who talk the talk also walk 
the walk” (Eichengreen, 2013). A similar statement can be found in Blanchard, 
Ostry, and Ghosh (2013): “international policy coordination is like the Loch Ness 
Monster – much discussed but rarely seen”. Bordo and Schenk (2017) provide 
experiences of coordination since the late nineteenth century. Agenor and Silva 
(2019) examine welfare gains from cooperation by employing a DSGE model and 
report that they are not large, but positive. Ostry and Ghosh (2013) stress the fact 
that despite welfare gains from policy coordination will not be huge, they are 
certainly measurable and worth pursuing. They further discuss obstacles on policy 
coordination and provide several proposals to overcome them. Taylor (2013) 
argues that near policy cooperation can be achieved by implementing rules-based 
monetary policies. Imisiker and Tas (2019) present evidence that communication 
among central bank governors in BIS Global Economy Meetings increases co-
movement of policy actions of central banks. Notwithstanding these discussions, in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis, policymakers of EMEs criticized 
monetary policies of advanced economies on the grounds that they pave the way 
for financial imbalances in EMEs and called for international policy coordination. 
The literature summarized in the introduction and Section III demonstrate how their 
concerns are well-founded.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This study analyzes the 2018-19 economic crisis in Turkey. Since the global 
financial crisis, cross-border lending to EMEs has surged. Up to mid-2018, in 
Turkey, foreign currency debt and consequently currency mismatches in the 
balance sheets of the nonfinancial corporates had surged in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. This rendered them vulnerable to a stop in cross-border 
lending and depreciation of currency. Under these conditions, tightening of 
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monetary policy of large developed economies can trigger crisis in emerging 
market economies. Instead, the main triggering factor was several tweets of the 
president of the US which sharply increased risk perception for Turkey and led to 
a reversal of capital flows and sharp depreciation of currency. Consequently, the 
Turkish economy contracted and employment rate declined considerably. We argue 
that several economic policy mistakes paved the way to the crisis, and draw a 
number of economic policy lessons. 
The first possible extension for future research is analyzing necessary 
institutional set-up to mitigate misallocation of cross-border flows to unproductive 
sectors. This is on the one hand related with prudential policies and a political 
economy problem on the other hand. The new institutional set-up should cope with 
rent-seeking behavior especially in the real estate sector. The second extension for 
future research is analyzing mechanisms to decrease dependence on foreign 
savings. This encompasses addressing low domestic savings problem and the 
subject of the first extension. 
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